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WHEN DEDUCTION LEADS TO BELIEF 
by Tobies Grimaltos and Christopher Hookway 
Abstract 
The paper questions the common assumption that rational individuals 
believe all propositions which they know to be logical consequences of their 
other beliefs: although we must acknowledge the truth of a proposition 
which is a deductive consequence ofour beliefs, we may not genuinely believe 
it. This conclusion is defended by arguing that some familiar counter- 
examples to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief fail because they 
involve propositions which are not really believed. Beliefs guide conduct or 
issue in assertion by answering questions which arise in the course of 
deliberation and conversation, but the troublesome cases present proposi- 
tions which do not present the agent's answer to any question. The  paper 
concludes by sketching the conditions under which the deductive conse- 
quences of our beliefs can be believed.' 
I .  Introduction 
It is generally assumed that deductive logic systematizes norms 
governing the formation of rational belief through inference: if you 
are aware that some proposition is a logical consequence of your 
beliefs, and you have no independent reason to doubt it, then you 
ought, rationally, to add it to your stock of beliefs; and if you do not 
believe the conclusion of a deductively sound argument, and you 
have no doubt of its soundness, you cannot, rationally, remain 
confident of the truth of all of the premises. Our aim in this paper is 
to question this assumption, in the light of some claims about belief 
and inference and about the role of questions in structuring our 
beliefs and inferences. 
Our target is a closure principle for belief. As a first approxima- 
tion, we may express i t  thus: 
If P is a deductive consequence of propositions that X believes, 
and X recognizes that this is the case, then X believes that P 
Scepticism about this principle is not uncommon: if X is 
antecedently doubtful of P, then recognizing that it is a consequence 
' The work contained in this papcr was carricd out during the academic year 1991-92, 
while Tobies Grimaltos was in receipt of a grant from the Dirrccicin General de Tnvestigacion 
Cicntifira y Tbcnicd of thc Spanish Ministry of Education. An earlier vcrsion was given at 
the University ofOviedo in 1993: we are grateful for comments received during a stimulating 
discussion on that occasion. 
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of his other beliefs may lead him to view his other beliefs with 
suspicion rather than accept P .  Accounting for this would require 
us to be careful in arriving at  an accurate specification of the 
principle, adding a rider to exclude cases where X has independent 
reasons for doubting P. And puzzles such as the lottery paradox 
may suggest that we can be agnostic about a proposition which is a 
consequence of a large number of beliefs if these beliefs are not 
absolutely certain. But the challenge we want to present is rather 
different: it does not depend upon features of unusual cases such as 
those just described. 
Our claim is defended through close examination of some cases 
that have emerged from discussion of the ‘Gettier problem’. Since 
Edmund Gettier published his original challenge to the thesis that 
knowledge was justified true belief in 1963,* the problem to which 
he gave his name has exercised an extraordinary attraction for 
analytical philosophers. As will be well known, the ‘problem’ is to 
provide a philosophical analysis of knowledge: a set of necessary 
and suficient conditions for the truth of propositions of the form x 
knows that p. Its appeal might be explained by pointing out that 
some philosophers like trying to solve puzzles where the rules for a 
solution being successful are clearly stated: the analysis must 
match our intuitions about the truth values of knowledge sentences. 
But since most philosophers would now be sceptical of the claim 
that all (or even most) philosophically interesting notions can 
receive reductive definitions of the sort sought by the Gettier 
industry, i t  is curious that the need for such a definition of knowledge 
is so widely taken for granted. Why do we need such a definition? 
And why do so many philosophers whose views elsewhere in the 
philosophy of language show much sophistication, continue to look 
for a reductive definition in epistemology? 
We do not propose to answer these questions here. However two 
observations which are relevant to answering them are worth 
noting. First, the counterexamples that are produced in the course 
of testing and refining definitions of knowledge are frequently of 
independent interest: cases are introduced where someone’s epi- 
stemic position is plainly flawed and it is very hard to see how or 
why; and other cases are introduced where we cannot see why 
someone’s beliefs possess epistemic merit. Hence the examples are 
interesting, as pointing to complexities in our practice of epistemic 
See Edmund Gettier ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge’, Analysis, 23.6, 1963, pp. 121- 
123. The examples to be discussed are all found in this paper. 
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evaluation, even if they do not direct us to a correct analysis of 
knows - or even if we do not attach much importance to the search 
for such an analysis. And second, the concepts introduced in the 
course of searching for an analysis have often been of independent 
interest even if they have not yielded an acceptable solution to the 
Gettier problem. For example, reliabilist and externalist themes in 
epistemology may originally have emerged in the course of 
attempts to define knows but their importance is now acknowledged 
independently of that connection. And few could deny the 
importance of Robert Nozick’s work on tracking or Alvin Goldman’s 
ideas about discrimination and perceptual knowledge: debates 
about causal theories of perception and about what it is to see 
something have been informed by the distinctions and conceptions 
uncovered by the Gettier debate, and these benefits are real 
whatever one thinks of the interest of the debate itself. If analyses of 
knowledge in terms of causation, reliability and defeasibility now 
have few defenders, these concepts have not lost their epistemo- 
logical significance (a  significance which was rarely remarked 
before they were used in furthering the Gettier debate). Thinking 
about the examples developed in trying to solve the Gettier 
problem can be epistemologically valuable even for someone with 
little real investment in ‘solving’ the original puzzle. 
Gettier’s original counter-examples to the claim that knowledge 
was justified true belief involved belief resulting from inference: 
true beliefs obtained through deductive reasoning from false but 
justified beliefs were plainly justified but were not knowledge. The 
believer who relies upon such an inference, we might suppose, is 
blameless: if you cannot trust the deductive consequences of your 
justified beliefs, what can you trust? O n  the other hand, in spite of 
the truth of the conclusion arrived at, the believer’s epistemic 
position is flawed or unsatisfactory. Blamelessly acquired true 
beliefs can, for all that, be epistemically flawed. 
We shall use these examples to raise some questions about the 
role of inference (particularly deductive inference) in producing 
new beliefs. We shall argue that Gettier’s own counter-examples to 
the standard account of knowledge rely upon the closure principle 
for belief which we want to reject. And we shall find that reflection 
upon these examples will help us to see why the principle is false. If 
we are correct, it will follow that Gettier’s putative counter- 
examples are nothing of the kind: they are not justified true belief 
because the belief condition is not satisfied. But we must emphasize 
that we are not offering a general solution to the Gettier problem. 
@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 
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We claim only that reflection upon a limited range of the examples 
thrown up by the debate can help us to gain a better perspective 
upon some questions about belief and inference. 
2. Gettier’s examples: deductive inference and belief 
Our strategy, then, is to begin by discussing the examples 
presented by Gettier in his original 1963 paper and to see what can 
be done by way of rejecting them on the grounds that the 
propositions that are alleged to be cases of justified true belief are 
not genuinely believed by the agents in questions. We begin with 
Gettier’s second example: we are to suppose that Smith forms the 
belief that Jones owns a Ford on the basis of strong evidence. Smith 
then selects three place names at random and constructs the 
following three propositions which, since they are entailed by the 
claim that Jones owns a Ford, he accepts: 
Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston. 
Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. 
Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. 
Despite the evidence, Jones no longer owns a Ford: perhaps he sold 
his Ford last week and Smith saw him driving a rented car. 
However since ‘by the sheerest coincidence and entirely unknown 
to Smith’, Brown has just landed in Barcelona, Smith’s belief in the 
second of these propositions is both true and justified. 
The underlying structure of the example can be represented 
thus: 
1. X believes that P and X has reason to believe that P 
2. X is aware that P entails P u Q. 
3. X thus has reason to believe P u Q 
4. X infers and thus believes that P u Q, 
5. Although P is false, Q (and hence P u Q) is true. 
6. So X has a justified true belief that P u Q. 
The assumption we have identified is involved in step 4. If the 
assumption is abandoned, one might question whether, in this case, 
X can infer the disjunctive proposition. Or,  more paradoxically, we 
could allow that he can infer it, but deny that his attitude towards 
his conclusion is one of belief. But why should that be a plausible 
claim? At first sight, i t  seems absurd. 
One way to defend it  would be to point out that beliefs have a 
role in the explanation of action and inference: if we know what 
@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 
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someone believes, we can understand and sometimes predict their 
behaviour. Hence we should ascribe to people no more beliefs than 
is warranted by this explanatory need. To ascribe to someone a 
belief that was explanatorily inert, in that case, makes no sense. 
Perhaps we can argue that the disjunctive ‘belief in Gettier’s case 
is unreal because it  can have no explanatory role. In  general, of 
course, disjunctive beliefs can have a role in explanations of actions 
and inferences. If I believe that my copy of Kant’s Critique o f  Pure 
Reason is either at home or in my office, and my search of my office 
is fruitless, I shall go home to find it. In  effect, the disjunctive belief 
is used as a premise for a step of disjunctive syllogism: once I learn 
that one disjunct is false, I plan my activities on the basis of the 
other disjunct. In Gettier’s example, this does not occur: i t  would 
be irrational for Smith to conclude (on hearing that Jones has sold 
his Ford) that Brown is in Barcelona, Boston and Brest-Litovsk. 
Indeed, any piece of Smith’s behaviour which could be explained 
as appropriate given the truth of one of the disjunctions could also 
be explained by reference to his non-disjunctive belief that Jones 
owns a Ford. This even explains his assent to the disjunctive 
proposition when asked its truth value: since he believes that Jones 
owns a Ford, he can see that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona 
must be true. It also enables us to understand why he is not 
tempted to draw any conclusion about Brown’s location on hearing 
that Jones is no longer a Ford owner. We might argue that our 
readiness to make such a step of disjunctive syllogism is a mark of a 
disjunctive belief being ‘psychologically real’. So if, when 
challenged, Smith acknowledges the truth of :Jones owns a Ford or 
Brown is in Barcelona’, we could explain this by saying that Smith 
believes that Jones owns a Ford and he knows that this entails that 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. There is no need to 
ascribe to him a psychologically real belief in the disjunctive claim. 
The ‘inference’ involved in the example we have discussed 
involved a step of ‘or-introduction’. We shall not be surprised to 
find strictly analogous examples which involve the parallel 
inferential process of existential generalization. Thus Keith Lehrer 
presents an example of a teacher who believes on good evidence 
that one of his students, a M r  Nogot, owns a Ferrari, and infers that 
at least one person in his class owns a Ferrari. This belief, it is 
alleged, would be justified and true if Nogot was not a Ferrari 
owner while another student does, in fact, own one.3 In line with 
’ See Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 19. 
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the argument of the previous paragraph, we could reasonably 
argue that for the existentially quantified belief to be psychologically 
real, the teacher must be prepared to conclude ‘So it must be 
someone else’ on hearing that Nogot does not own a Ferrari. Unless 
that condition is satisfied, we can explain all of the teacher’s actions 
and inferences by reference to the belief about Nogot without 
appeal to the existentially quantified belief: and we explain his 
avowal that someone in the class owns a Ferrari by reference to his 
belief that Nogot does. 
Gettier’s own first example is slightly more complex - but only 
slightly so. Smith and Jones have applied for a job. Smith believes, 
with reason: 
1. Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket 
He  concludes: 
2. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
In  fact, of course, Smith himself will be appointed to the post, and 
he too has ten coins in his pocket. The principal difference between 
this example and Lehrer’s is that the conclusion involves a definite 
description rather than an existential quantifier. I t  is easy to show 
that this does not affect the substantive point being made. To see 
this, we must take into account the pragmatic ambiguities to be 
found in uses of definite descriptions: are we to take the use of ‘The 
man who will get the job’ in (2) referentially or attributively? If the 
former, then the assertion is simply an alternative expression of the 
belief that Jones has ten coins in his pocket and does not present a 
counterexample to the traditional analysis of knowledge. If the 
latter, the assertion has a distinct content but, as with the other two 
examples, it is reasonable to deny that i t  is psychologically real. On 
hearing that he rather than Jones has the job, he will not exploit (2) 
and conclude ‘So I must have ten coins in my pocket’. Nothing is 
explained by belief in the conclusion which is not, as easily, 
explained by belief in the premises. Psychological reality of a belief 
calls for a sort of autonomy or robustness which is lacking in this 
case. 
We are not claiming that any general morals about how to solve 
the Gettier problem can be derived from this. Thinking these 
examples through is a useful way of focusing on some issues about 
the role of inference in the enlargement of our knowledge, but i t  
probably does not promise a general recipe for defending a 
traditional conception of knowledge. But we would expect the 
@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 
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suggestions made so far to convince no one. Given the initial 
plausibility of the claim that, for example, the teacher in Lehrer’s 
example believes that at least one student owns a Ferrari, then we 
would expect the reader to question our initial suggestion about 
when a belief is psychologically real or to question its relevance to 
the epistemic issues under discussion. 
I t  would be natural to complain that if Smith would assert the 
disjunctive proposition that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, 
of if he would assent to it, then we are correct to ascribe to him a 
belief in that proposition. Even if our claims about when beliefs are 
psychologically real are correct, the critic could suggest that there 
is a kind of ambiguity in the concept of belief and conclude that 
there is a second conception which is at issue when we are doing 
epistemology. Failing that, a counter-example to justified true 
‘assent’ (or ‘preparedness to assert’) might be as interesting as one 
to justified true belief. We shall address this below (sections 3 to 6). 
To forestall a second line of attack, we should note that we are not 
arguing that deduction never produces belief our argument 
depends upon special features of the deductive inferences under 
discussion, for example their great simplicity. We shall discuss 
when deduction does generate belief in section 7; and we shall 
consider what a true Gettier style counter example relying on 
deduction would have to be like. 
3. Two conceptions o f  belief3 
The argument presented in the last section rests upon the 
assumption that the concept of belief employed in the definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief is the same as that invoked in 
familiar styles of belief/desire explanation of behaviour. We 
argued, in effect: since the inferential ‘beliefs’ that Gettier and 
Lehrer invoke do not have a fundamental role in the explanation of 
inference or action, they are not real beliefs. However it is natural 
to object that we have relied upon too restrictive a conception of 
beliec it does not do violence to our everyday concept (which is 
presumably what is appealed to in the traditional analysis of 
knowledge) to ascribe belief in a proposition to someone who is 
ready to assert it, to commit him or herself to its truth. If the 
teacher would bet on the proposition that someone in his class owns 
a Ferrari, or if he would volunteer that information when asked 
about the car owning habits of his class, then, plainly, he believes 
the proposition. 
@ Basil Blackwell I.td. 1995 
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We can clarify this point by distinguishing two conceptions of 
Belie5 : somebody believesl something when their acceptance of 
i t  has a fundamental role in accounting for their behaviour; 
Belief2: somebody believes2 a proposition when they are disposed 
to assert it. 
In  that case, the objection runs, we have argued only that someone 
may believe2 a proposition which he or she does not believel. 
Consider the first example we discussed. Smith’s ‘belief that Jones 
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, we urged, is not 
psychologically real: it is not a case of what we have now called 
belief,. But, surely, Smith does stand ready to assert that 
proposition: he stands in the belief2 relation to it. We have shown, 
at best, that the psychological basis of belief2 in a proposition can in 
fact be the state of believing1 some different proposition. This is 
relevant to the evaluation of Gettier’s counter-examples only if the 
traditional analysis of knowledge identifies it with justified true 
beliefl. But that is very implausible; the traditional analysis of 
knowledge would surely hold that a justified readiness to assert a 
true proposition is suficient for knowledge: knowledge is justified 
true belief2. 
Since assertion is itself a species of action, this distinction of 
senses of ‘believe’ may seem questionable. We shall now argue that 
the intuitive distinction underlying the response is best accounted 
for within the perspective that we defend. First, it is doubtful that 
the propositions in question are believed even in this putative 
second sense. Does Smith stand ready to assert this peculiar 
disjunctive proposition? It is difficult to imagine circumstances in 
which he would be able to do so, in which it would be intelligible 
that he would freely make the assertion that Jones owns a Ford or 
Brown is in Barcelona. Any such assertion would naturally be 
taken as expressing a psychologically real disjunctive belief - or as 
trying to induce such a psychologically real belief in an audience. 
Plainly if someone were to ask him whether the proposition is true, 
he would acknowledge that it was: this is the sort of thing that 
happens in a logic class or logic examination. This gives him an 
opportunity to assent to the proposition, but that falls short of 
actively asserting it. So we shall allow that you can assent to 
propositions which you do not believe!, but that you can only assert 
propositions which you either believe, yourself or those which you 
believe that your audience should rationally believe1. So far, the 
belief: 
@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 
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distinction between two kinds of belief is of little help unless it  is 
used to identify those propositions to which you would assent. 
What the objection rests upon is the evident truth that Smith will 
assent to these disjunctive propositions which he may not believeI. 
In such a case the subject believes a certain disjunctive proposition 
to be true - this is a belief2 and may even be a belief]. Our claim 
will be that believing a proposition to be true is all that is required 
for ‘assent’ and that this is distinct from believing the proposition: 
to believe2 that p, and to believe:! that p is a true proposition, are 
not always the same. 
‘This distinction may also seem unpromising. Indeed, one of the 
‘obvious’ intuitions used to motivate deflationary theories of truth 
is that to believe that p and to believe that i t  is true that p are the 
same. The belief about the truth of a proposition may be described 
as second order. The reader may be reminded of a more familiar 
distinction: someone who knows no Spanish may believe that the 
sentence ‘En Espana, 10s buzones de correos son amarillos’ is true 
without believing that in Spain, post boxes are yellow. Other 
examples may be introduced without invoking other languages: if 
someone is ignorant of Physics but has overheard remarks on a 
radio documentary, they may believe that ‘Electrons have negative 
charge’ is true without believing that electrons have negative 
charge. Our examples differ from these: the ‘second order beliefs’ 
concern ‘propositions rather than sentences; and there has been no 
suggestion that these propositions are not understood. Unpromising 
as i t  may seem, we believe that something can be done with this 
distinction: we shall argue that if we understand the notion of the 
content of a belief or assertion correctly, these odd ‘propositions’ do 
not identify such contents. In a defensible sense, the second order 
claims do specify the contents of possible assertions while the 
corresponding first order propositions do not. In that case, since 
our elucidation of belief2 linked it to a readiness to assert the 
proposition in question, it is reasonable to claim that they are not 
believed2. 
4. Knowledge, assertions, questions 
As we noted in the first section, most epistemologists have focused 
on claims to propositional knowledge. For example, contributors to 
the Gettier debate have tried to offer analyses of sentences of the 
form X knows that p, where the complement to ‘knows’ specifies the 
content of a proposition. This has the advantage of preserving a 
@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 
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logical and grammatical parallel between knowledge and belief. On 
the assumption that knowledge is a variety of belief (belief which is 
true and justified, belief which tracks the truth etc), then it is not 
surprising that these parallels are emphasised. Knowledge takes a 
propositional complement because it  involves belief which is a 
propositional attitude. 
Moreover if these expressions are used to refer to propositional 
attitudes, then another source of the implausibility of some of our 
claims emerges. I t  is natural to assume that such attitudes can be 
taken to any proposition: if, say, I have a pro-attitude towards the 
truth of a proposition, then I believe it. And since connectives such 
as ‘or’ can be used to form complex propositions out of simpler 
ones, it is unsurprising that Gettier’s subjects form beliefs in these 
disjunctive propositions. However this strategy can prevent our 
taking full account of distinctive features of the logic of ‘knows’: 
these grammatical parallels between ‘knows’ and ‘believes’ are 
superficial. 
We can see this by noting that many knowledge claims (possibly 
most of those that are made in ordinary conversation) do not 
concern propositional knowledge. Consider the following examples 
where ‘knows’ takes an indirect question complement: 
Jones knows where Brown is. 
The teacher knows who owns a Ferrari. 
The Physics professor knows why water expands on freezing. 
The weather forecaster knows whether the sun will shine 
tomorrow. 
We shall refer to these knowledge claims as Q-claims and the more 
familiar propositional knowledge sentences as P - c l ~ i m s . ~  It is 
instructive that there is no indirect question form of belief-sentence: 
‘John believes where Brown is’, ‘The teacher believes who owns a 
Ferrari’ are ungrammatical although we can use awkward ex- 
pressions such as ‘The teacher has a belief concerning who owns a 
Ferrari’. The  significance of such grammatical disanalogies is 
always controversial, but we believe that focusing upon Q-claims is 
a source of considerable philosophical insight. 
We are often interested in whether someone possesses knowledge 
because we wish to escape from ignorance concerning the answer to 
some question. If I am agnostic about why water expands on 
The approach to the understanding of knowledge defended here was developed in C. J. 
Hookway Scepficism (London: Routledge, 1990), chapter X.  
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freezing, then when I learn that the physics professor knows this 
(knows why water expands on freezing), I shall be ready to accept 
whatever answer he offers to the question: he or she is identified as 
a realiable or trustworthy source of information. I then rely upon a 
distinctive form of inference which we refer to as the knowledge 
X knows Q 
X’s answer to Q is P. 
so, P. 
So we can think of the possessor of knowledge as having the ability 
to answer a question correctly. As Edward Craig has emphasized, 
we use the concept of knowledge in the course of identifying sources 
of good or reliable information.“ This need not only be exploited in 
the context of learning from someone’s testimony. Suppose that I 
am aware that a friend is undertaking a journey which requires her 
to catch the morning train to Manchester. In the course of making 
her journey, she has to put to herself the question When is the morning 
train to Munchester? Unless she ‘answers herself correctly, her overall 
plans will not succeed. So I can be interested in whether she has the 
correct answer to a question because she needs this answer in order 
to succeed in some project. Indeed, one way to think of the role of 
beliefs in guiding conduct is that they provide answers to the 
different questions that arise in the course of planning a course of 
action. So if someone believes that P, then we can expect that 
whenever a question arises to which P is an answer, then, so long as 
then can see that P is such an answer, they will act on the basis that 
P, ceteris p a r i b ~ s . ~  
So questions have a role in ascribing knowledge to people, in 
planning courses of action, and in seeking testimony. If you meet 
my request for information by asserting that the next train out of 
town is tomorrow morning, then your assertion is explicitly the 
answer to a question. I t  is natural to hold that even those assertions 
This formulation differs slightly from that found in Hookway, Scepticism. The reasons for 
the change can be found in Christopher Hookway, ‘Knowledge, Questions and Context: a 
response to Fogelin’, Analysis, 53.3, (1993), pp. 132-136. 
See Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State ofNature, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), passim. 
’ We need this ceterisparzbus qualification because the agent may have other answers to the 
question available, or because recognizing that P i s  an answer to this question can contribute 
their belief being weakened. 
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which are not responses to explicit questions, can be understood 
only when we recognize that the speaker saw that a question arose 
in the context and was responding to it. If we can see no intelligible 
question that the speaker could be answering, we can make no 
sense of the linguistic action that is performed. So if we think of 
knowledge as, primarily, the ability to answer a question, we can 
understand the connections between knowledge, action and the 
planning of conduct, and assertion. And if we think of beliefs as 
stored answers to questions that might arise in planning actions or 
in conversation, then there are prospects for explaining the 
connection between knowledge and belief. 
If these connections can be clarified and made precise, then the 
following principles hold: 
I. X can believeI that P only if there exists a question to which P 
is the answer. 
11. X can assert (i.e. believe2) that P only if there exists a 
question to which P is the answer. 
111. X can know that P only if there exists a question to which P 
is the answer. 
In  that case, we must defend our view of Gettier’s original counter- 
examples by showing that there are no questions to which these 
propositions are answers. And we must defend our claim about 
knowing propositions to be true by showing that there can be a 
question to which ‘ P  is true’ is the answer even if there is no 
question to which ‘P‘ is the answer. 
Thus there is a question ‘Who will get the job’ to which Smith, in 
Gettier’s example, possesses the wrong answer; similarly, the 
teacher possesses the wrong answer to the question ‘Who owns a 
Ferrari?’. And Smith has an incorrect answer to the question ‘What 
kind of car does Jones drive?’. This much is straightforward. If 
Gettier’s examples are genuinely to count against the claim that 
knowledge is justified true belief, there must be genuine questions 
to which his subjects possess true, justified but epistemically flawed 
answers. I t  is this that we must now consider. 
5. Questions and Gettier’s Examples 
Let us now return to the case of Smith and the proposition that 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. If this proposition is to 
be asserted, known or believed, then, in the light of the three 
principles stated above, there must be a question to which it  is an 
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answer. Before asking what this question might be, we should look 
at  less problematic examples of disjunctive knowledge or belief. 
Suppose that somebody believes that the next train to London 
leaves at either 16.10 or at 16.40. Such a subject does not know 
when the train leaves, nor do they have a definite opinion about 
which answer to that question is the correct one. But their 
epistemic position with respect to that question is not wholly 
inadequate; they have some information with a bearing on the 
matter. If we associate with a question its set of possible answers, 
then our subject can rule out many of the answers that the question 
can receive: indeed, they can narrow the range of choice down to 
two. They know whether the next train leaves at 17.00 and they 
know whether i t  leaves at 15.50 and so on. Their ‘disjunctive’ belief 
is an acknowledgement that they can narrow the range of answers 
that need to be taken into account in discovering the answer but 
that they cannot lead us directly to the correct response. This is 
why the disjunctive knowledge licenses the use of disjunctive 
syllogism: once we or they can eliminate one of the disjuncts, we 
can recognize the other disjunct as the correct answer to the 
question. This suggests that we can make sense of disjunctive 
belief, assertion and knowledge when there is a question to which 
each of the disjuncts is a possible answer. We assert disjunctive 
propositions when we wish to provide a partial but incomplete 
solution to an  implicit or explicit question. A disjunctive proposition 
can never be the complete answer to a question. 
For it to be any kind of answer to the question at all, then, we 
suggest, it has to rule out some of the possible answers. If a 
disjunctive proposition were simply the disjunction of all possible 
answers, then it is not even a partial answer to the question and 
cannot intelligibly be asserted, known or believed. Consider the 
proposition that Libya is in Europe or Asia or Africa or North America or 
South America or Australasia or Antarctica. It  rules out no possible 
answer to the question In  what continent is Libya? So  long as that 
question provides the context of the assertion, that claim is a kind 
of pragmatic tautology: it cannot be sensibly asserted. At best it 
records one’s understanding of the question but it is not even a 
partial answer to it. 
Let us now turn back to the second Gettier example. Our 
question is: can a single step of ‘or-introduction’ ever give rise to a 
new belief or to something that the speaker can assert? There are 
two different cases to take into account. First, suppose, varying 
Gettier’s example, that Smith infers Jones owns a Ford or Jones owns a 
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Peugeot. If we have in mind the implicit question What kind o f  car does 
Jones own? then, in this case, Smith disjoins two possible answers to 
that question. But in that case, the disjunction is not Smith’s 
answer to the question: his answer is Jones owns a Ford. This is 
evident from the fact that evidence that Jones has sold his Ford will 
not lead Smith to infer the other answer. Whenever the question 
arises, in conversation or in planning his actions, Smith should go 
by his answer and not by this disjunction. Hence Smith infers a 
conclusion that can have no role in sincere assertion or in planning 
conduct: the proposition is neither believedl or believed2. There is 
no question to which the disjunction is Smith’s answer. 
The second case, Gettier’s own example, offers a further 
complexity. It is far from clear that there is a question to which the 
propositions Jones owns a Ford and Brown is in Barcelona are both 
competing answers. We are strongly tempted to deny that there is 
such a question; but since we fear that someone with more 
ingenuity than we have could come up with a complicated counter- 
example to that claim, we shall simply state that we do not know if 
there is one. If there is such a question, the case parallels the one 
just considered. If there is not, then the proposition is not one that 
can be asserted, known, or made the object of a psychologically real 
belief. This is because there is no scenario in which it could be 
appealed to in order to answer a question that confronts us. In  
general, if I confidently believe one disjunct of a disjunctive 
proposition, there can be no question to which the whole 
disjunction is my answer, in which case no sense can be made of my 
sincerely asserting the proposition, believing it, or knowing it. 
The other Gettier examples, together with Lehrer’s case of the 
teacher and the Ferrari do not differ in kind from this one. Since 
our response to these examples can be guessed from the previous 
paragraphs, we shall not consider them further here. However, we 
should comment on an interesting variant of Lehrer’s ‘Nogot’ 
example (section 2 above). The teacher recalls once believing of a 
particular student that he or she possessed a Ferrari but now 
forgets which student that was. Consequently he now believes only 
that some student has a Ferrari, inferring this from the recollection 
that he once believed of a particular student that he or she did  SO.^ 
There is a further variant where the quantified belief is caused by the original forgotten 
belief but the teacher has no recollection of where i t  originated. Such a belief would be 
psychologically real, and so might provide thc basis of a genuine counter-example; but one 
might also reasonably doubt whether i t  is really justified. 
@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995 
38 TOBIES GRIMAI.TOS AND CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY 
If the quantified belief is made true by the car ownership of a 
student other than the one that was the object of the lost belief, do 
we then have a Gettier style counter-example? This conclusion can 
be avoided by claiming that even in this case ‘some student in the 
class’ functions referentially rather than as a straightforward 
existential quantifier. Confronting the question of who owns a 
Ferrari, the teacher commits himself to the correctness of a 
particular answer which he can specify only indirectly: he is 
committed to the correctness of the answer he once explicitly 
endorsed. In that case, the ownership of a Ferrari by some other 
student would not make the belief true. 
6. Knowing whether a proposition is true 
We claimed above that although Gettier’s subject does not believe 
that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, he does believe that 
this disjunctive proposition is true, We must now explain how this 
is possible. Consider a simple question such as When does the next 
train leave? If we were to list its possible answers, it would contain: 
The next train will leave at 16.00 
The next train will leave at 16.10 
The next train will leave at 16.20 
and so on. In this case, the different answers have the same subject 
or topic (the next train) and ascribe a range of different properties 
to that subject. Moreover the different properties belong to a set - 
e.g. the set of times after 16.00 this afternoon: they are all related 
times. So in choosing an answer, we decide which of these 
properties belongs to this thing. We might schematize this: 
a is FI  
a is F2 
a is F3 
Not all questions have this simple form. And even among those that 
do, not all exploit lists of properties that can be worked out in the a 
priori way that is possible with this list of times. 
If someone is to have genuine knowledge of the disjunctive 
proposition involved in the Gettier example, there would have to be 
a question whose list of possible answers includes: 
Jones owns a Ford 
Brown is in Barcelona 
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This does not fit the pattern we gave above: the answers have 
different subjects, and the predicates they use, (‘owns a Ford’, ‘is in 
Barcelona’) lack the systematic unity found in our simple case. If 
we are to find a question to which this disjunction was an 
intelligible response it would probably be a ‘why-question’: we are 
considering two explanations of (say) a murder, and the first can be 
sustained only if Jones owns a Ford whereas the second requires 
Brown to be in Barcelona. If we are convinced that one of these 
explanations is correct but cannot work out which, we might 
intelligibly carry out an investigation into whether Jones owns a 
Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. But this is an unusual case and is 
not involved in Gettier’s example. 
On the other hand, when we affirm that Jones owns a Ford or Brown 
is in Barcelona is true, then we answer a question with the possible 
answers: 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is true 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is false, 
This fits the ‘a is F,’ pattern perfectly. And we can easily imagine 
situations - in a logic class, or in the course of writing a textbook - 
in which this question can arise. Even defenders of a deflationary 
theory of truth can agree that the concept of truth has value in 
discussing the semantics of propositional languages. 
7. When does deduction yield belieJ3 
In this concluding section, we address two questions. We have 
shown that certain deductive ‘inferences’ do not produce belief (or 
knowledge). Does this result apply to all putative beliefs resting 
upon deduction? Or are there cases where deduction leads to 
genuine (psychologically real) belief? And (this is the second 
question) are there genuine ‘Gettier cases’ based upon deductive 
reasoning? It  would be interesting to go on to consider whether the 
strategy we have used in addressing Gettier’s counter-examples 
could be applied to other cases from the literature too - including 
cases where no deductive reasoning is involved. Unfortunately, we 
lack the space to do that on this occasion. 
So, first, when does a chain of deductive reasoning give rise to a 
genuine (psychologically real) belief? Two different sorts of answers 
could be given. First, we could argue that an inferred belief is 
psychologically real when the inference is sufficiently complicated 
that it is impracticable to rely upon the premises and repeat the 
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inference whenever it becomes necessary to answer a question to 
which the inferred belief is relevant. Or  second, we could argue - 
relying upon the views about questions that have been defended 
here - that an inferred belief is ‘real’ whenever there is a real 
question to which it  is an answer. In order to assess these answers, 
let us consider an example of a belief which would be real by the 
second criterion but not by the first. Do you believe that Madonna 
is mortal? If ever the question arose, you could infer this from: 
Madonna is a human being 
All human beings are mortal. 
There are interesting questions in Cognitive Science concerning 
how such information is stored. I t  is implausible that (at least 
before today) you stored your view of Madonna’s mortality as a 
separate item of information: the information is readily available to 
you, whenever required, without being separately stored. This 
might suggest that it is not ‘psychologically real’. On the other 
hand, if anyone were to proclaim her immortality, you would (we 
hope) be affronted that one of your better embedded convictions 
was contradicted. This seems to be a case where the conclusion of 
the inference is thought of as an object of belief, however it is 
stored, and however simple the inference may be which is required 
to elicit it. 
This suggests we should adopt the second approach. On this 
occasion deductive reasoning yields belief (even if you have not yet 
carried out the deduction) because there is a question to which the 
deduced proposition is an answer (partial or complete). This seems 
correct although further qualification is needed. Consider the 
following example. 
John believes that the murder was committed by someone who 
was (say) a body builder, and he is aware that Peter and Paul 
were the only body builders who had the opportunity to commit 
the crime. He also happens to believe that the murderer made 
his getaway by car, and he has the information that Paul is a 
non-driver. 
From the first two pieces of information he can deduce that Peter or 
Paul was the murderer; and this is a partial answer to his question. 
But, we assume, he does not believe this because he also has 
available information that rules Paul out of consideration. We 
would expect him to believe that Peter was the criminal. Perhaps 
he can believe a proposition when there is a question to which it is 
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the strongest answer that he can infer from the rest of his beliefs. O r  
must it be the strongest answer which he does infer? If he fails to 
notice the relevance of the information about Paul’s being a non- 
driver, then, it seems, he believes the disjunctive proposition. Thus 
our settled answer is: 
Deduction gives rise to belief when the there is a question to 
which the conclusion of the inference is the strongest answer 
possessed by the believer. 
The answer to the second question - can deductive reasoning ever 
give rise to Gettier examples? - is ‘Of course’. Amend the example 
just considered as follows: in spite of strong evidence to the 
contrary, Paul can drive; but, in spite of that, Peter is the guilty 
party. Our subject may still (through deduction) arrive at  a true, 
justified but epistemically flawed identification of the murderer. 
The case differs from Gettier’s own examples because the inference 
provides an  answer to a question which is psychologically real and 
is answered by none of the premises alone. 
The moral to be drawn from this discussion - that the study of 
questions should be central to the epistemological study of belief 
and inference - provides another example of the fertility of 
reflection on the Gettier examples. Inference is an attempt to arrive 
at an answer to a question; believing a proposition involves using it 
to answer questions; and knowledge is a relation between an agent 
and a question. Treating propositional attitudes in abstraction 
from this context distorts our understanding of cognition. 
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